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The Breath of Life: Christian Perspectives  
on Conception and Ensoulment
Lindsey Disney and Larry Poston*
Is “human life” strictly a biological phenomenon measured from 
the moment when sperm and egg combine? Or does “human life” 
not actually begin until the immaterial aspect known as “the soul” 
appears at some indeterminate point? This essay examines the 
views held by various adherents of the Christian faith regarding 
the concepts of “conception” and “ensoulment” and the relation of 
these views to contemporary ethical issues having to do with abor­
tion, in vitro fertilization, contraception, and stem cell research. 
The essay discusses the fact that Christians historically have been 
characterized by a marked lack of unity concerning the teachings 
of the Bible and tradition on these issues. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of how Pre­existentianists, Traducianists, and 
Creationists might or might not be troubled by contraceptive and 
abortive procedures, depending upon their varying convictions 
regarding ensoulment. 
In The Catechism of the Catholic Church, paragraph number 
2270 states that “human life must be respected and protected abso-
lutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of his 
existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a 
person.” Paragraph 2274 continues in the same vein: “Since it must be 
treated from conception as a person, the embryo must be defended in 
its integrity, cared for, and healed, as far as possible, like any other 
human being.” And paragraph 2322 concludes that “from its concep-
tion, the child has the right to life. Direct abortion . . . is a criminal 
practice, gravely contrary to the moral law. The Church imposes the 
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canonical penalty of excommunication for this crime against human 
life.”1
In an amicus curiae submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in Oc-
tober 1988, the Eastern Orthodox Church stated its conviction that 
“modern science has borne out the prescient wisdom of the Holy Fa-
thers of the Church, that life begins at conception, and at no other 
arbitrary or scholastically derived juncture.”2
In May of 1982, the Southern Baptist Convention adopted a 
“Resolution on Abortion and Infanticide” which contained the follow-
ing phraseology: “Whereas, Both medical science and biblical refer-
ences indicate that human life begins at conception, and Whereas, 
Southern Baptists have traditionally upheld the sanctity and worth of 
all human life, both born and pre-born, as being created in the image 
of God . . . Be it finally RESOLVED, That we support and will work 
for appropriate legislation and/or constitutional amendment which 
will prohibit abortions except to save the physical life of the mother.”3
And on January 22, 2007, Bill H.R. 618 was introduced to the 
U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Duncan Hunter 
(R-CA)—a born-again Southern Baptist—proposing that the terms 
“human person” and “human being” be defined as “each and every 
member of the species homo sapiens at all stages of life, including, but 
not limited to, the moment of fertilization, cloning, or other moment at 
which an individual member of the human species comes into being.”4
The examples above give clear evidence that a majority of Chris-
tians in the modern world—Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant— 
believe (or are supposed to believe) that human life begins at the mo-
ment that sperm and egg unite. Given this presupposition, it is natural 
to conclude that the termination of a pregnancy at any stage is tanta-
mount to the murder of a human being. The impression is given in 
numerous books, articles, and websites that failure to hold either 
the presupposition or its implication is sufficient cause for calling 
into question an individual’s spiritual sanctification—if not his or her 
actual salvation. 
1 Catechism of the Catholic Church (New York: Image Books/Doubleday, 1994), 
606–607, 618.
2 “An Orthodox View of Abortion,” http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/praxis/abortion.
aspx.
3 “Southern Baptist Convention Resolutions on Abortion,” http://www.johnstons
archive.net/baptist/sbcabres.html.
4 “H.R. 618—Right to Life Act,” http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=
h110–618.
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But the conviction that “human life begins at the moment of con-
ception” is not the historic norm among religions in general. Even 
in the history of Christianity there has never been a united voice on 
this issue. In actuality, neither the Christian Scriptures nor modern 
science provide sufficient data to enable us to draw indisputable con-
clusions regarding this topic. Much of our confusion may be attrib-
uted to our failure to distinguish between the concepts of “life” and 
“ensoulment.”
Distinguishing Between “Life” and “Ensoulment”
Our first order of business must be to define and discuss the dis-
tinction between “life” and “ensoulment.” There are several extant 
definitions and lists of criteria for establishing what comprises “life,” 
but a comprehensive definition may be found in the Stanford Ency­
clopedia of Philosophy, which states that “living entities [are those 
which] metabolize, grow, die, reproduce, respond, move, have com-
plex organized functional structures, heritable variability, and lineages 
which can evolve over generational time, producing new and emer-
gent functional structures that provide increased adaptive fitness in 
changing environments.”5
Using such a definition leads to the conclusion that “life” is cer-
tainly not exclusive to human beings. The term “living” may be just as 
applicable to animals or even plants. Cows and owls, dogs and frogs, 
mice and lice; all are “alive” according to science. Until quite recently, 
however, no non-human creature has been accorded the same status 
as a human being. Each lacks “something” that distinguishes humans 
from all other living forms on the planet. Philosophically and reli-
giously speaking, this distinctive aspect is called “the soul”: an imma-
terial “something” that endows a human being with an intellect, 
emotions, a will, and an autonomous “sense of self.” This “something” 
cannot be identified under a microscope; it cannot be described in 
terms of size, shape, texture, color, or the like. But it is presumed to 
exist nonetheless. 
It is the matter of “ensoulment”—of when a soul becomes pres-
ent in a human—that most concerns us in this essay. For it is one 
thing to speak of “when life begins,” but quite another to speak of 
when “the soul” enters or is present in a human body. These are 
5 Bruce Weber, “Life,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2006 
edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta; http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/life. 
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entirely distinguishable items, and though they may be simultaneous 
in their origins, they are not necessarily so. One can maintain that 
“life” begins at the moment of conception without holding that “en-
soulment” occurs at that same time, and such a distinction could po-
tentially lead to very controversial convictions regarding various moral 
and ethical issues extant today.
Ensoulment in the History of Religions
Christianity
We will begin our study of ensoulment with the Christian reli-
gion. Views regarding the time and means of this phenomenon vary 
greatly even within this single religious system, and so Christianity’s 
theological considerations of this subject will provide us with a tem-
plate for classifying the views of other religious systems of thought, 
both Eastern and Western.
It is important to note that when dealing with the topic of 
“ensoulment” within the parameters of Christianity, we will mainly 
be examining “Christian,” not necessarily “biblical,” views. Despite 
claims to the contrary, the canonical Scriptures of the Christian faith 
do not directly answer the question of when “life” begins or when 
“ensoulment” occurs. To illustrate: Psalm 139:13, which contains Da-
vid’s conviction that “you [God] created my inmost being; you knit me 
together in my mother’s womb,”6 is often used as a model verse for 
Christian pro-life activists. But what does this passage actually teach 
us? The literary genre of the Psalms in general, as well as the context 
of this particular psalm, are not scientific in orientation. The intent of 
the psalmist is to praise God, and David is using the forms that are 
appropriate in a psalm—poetry and metaphor—to get his point 
across: that God is to be praised because God cares enough to know 
David intimately. 
Even if for the sake of argument we were to consider Psalm 
139:13 literally rather than metaphorically, the passage could still be 
construed as saying no more than that God sovereignly brought about 
the life of David, one of God’s closest followers and “a man after his 
own heart” (1 Samuel 13:14). The passage does not necessarily imply 
6 All Scripture references are from the Holy Bible, Today’s New International 
Version TNIV (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2001, 2005).
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that God “creates the inmost being” of every fetus in every womb; it 
could well be that God sovereignly chooses to “create the inmost be-
ing” only of those that he knows through his foreknowledge will reach 
full-term in their development. Neither does the passage address the 
issue of when such an inner-being creation occurs for those in which 
God does choose to do so.
A parallel example would be that of Jeremiah 1:5, which says: 
“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, before you were born 
I set you apart.” Some have concluded that this verse proves that God 
considers fetuses in the womb to be human beings, loved and known 
by him. Others, however, are persuaded that the passage says only 
that God knew that this particular fetus in this particular womb would 
become Jeremiah—an important prophet—and indicates that God in 
his sovereignty planned the creation of Jeremiah even before his con-
ception, just as Ephesians 1:4 indicates that all of God’s elect were 
chosen “before the creation of the world.”
Because of the ambiguity of these and other scriptural passages, 
the history of Christianity has seen the development of three distinct 
views with respect to ensoulment: Pre-existentianism, Traducianism, 
and Creationism. 
Pre­existentianism. Pre-existentianism is the belief that souls are 
preexistent entities who await bodies to enter. According to this con-
cept, the body is essentially “accidental” and relatively unimportant; a 
human being is complete without a physical body. Historically, very 
few within Christian circles have held or taught this view, though 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints adopted it in the nine-
teenth century and certain New Age groups have more recently 
attempted syncretisms between Christianity and Eastern reincarna-
tionism that include forms of pre-existentianism. From the standpoint 
of the historic canonical writings, however, there is no support for the 
idea of “souls awaiting bodies.” To the contrary, there are several pas-
sages which speak of the physical body as an essential aspect of hu-
manness as well as the physical manifestation of the members of the 
church both now and in eternity (see, for instance, 1 Corinthians 
6:15–19 and 15:35–44). 
Traducianism. The doctrine of Traducianism teaches that the 
“soul” is present in both the sperm and the egg when they unite. 
The combination forms a new “soul” automatically and immediately. 
Traducianism has been held by at least some Christians since the 
church’s earliest years. Tertullian (c.160–c.225), for instance, wrote 
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that “we allow that life begins with conception, because we contend 
that the soul also begins from conception; life taking its commence-
ment at the same moment and place that the soul does.”7 Clement of 
Alexandria presented a much more detailed description: 
The embryo is a living thing; for that the soul entering into the 
womb after it has been by cleansing prepared for conception, and 
introduced by one of the angels who preside over generation,  
and who knows the time for conception, moves the woman to in-
tercourse; and that, on the seed being deposited, the spirit, which 
is in the seed, is, so to speak, appropriated, and is thus assumed 
into conjunction in the process of formation.8
The Traducianist view was also held by Gregory of Nyssa (335–
c.394) and Maximus the Confessor (c.580–662). The latter’s argument 
was based on the example of Christ, who had been pronounced by the 
Ecumenical Church councils to be fully human and fully divine from 
the first moment of his conception—implying that he possessed a 
spiritual soul from that instant. If, as the Bible teaches, Christ was like 
us (humans) in all things except for sin, then it must be true that all 
human beings receive a spiritual soul at conception as well.9
Some scholars hold that the Traducianist view best explains the 
transmission of original sin. Bruce Waltke, for instance, concludes 
that “on the basis of inherited sin, . . . man’s spiritual element is passed 
on mediately from Adam and not as the immediate creation of God, 
who does not author sin.”10 If the soul is automatically generated by 
the joining of sperm and egg, God avoids the accusation that he has 
indirectly been party to the transmission of sin. But here a question 
arises: if the soul is brought forth by the union of the parents, then are 
they to be seen as the true creators of life and God only an interested 
(or even disinterested) observer? Traducianism is essentially deistic in 
 
7 Tertullian, “A Treatise on the Soul,” in The Ante­Nicene Fathers, vol. 3, ed. 
A. Roberts, J. Donaldson, and A. C. Coxe (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980), 27.
8 Clement of Alexandria, “Excerpts of Theodotus,” in Roberts, Ante­Nicene 
Fathers, 50.
9 Cited in David Albert Jones, “The Appeal to the Christian Tradition in the De-
bate about Embryonic Stem Cell Research,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 
(July 2005): 274.
10 Bruce K. Waltke, “Reflections from the Old Testament on Abortion,” Journal of 
the Evangelical Theological Society 19, no. 1: 12.
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that God’s creative powers are held to have initiated life—including 
the soul—only in the case of Adam and Eve. Since that time, the gen-
eration of “life” and “soul” has been the prerogative of humans alone.
Creationism. The doctrine of Creationism maintains that the 
“soul” is created and introduced into a fetus by God at a point of his 
choosing, either at the time of a fetus’s first breath, as was the case 
with Adam in Genesis 2:7, or when God in his sovereignty knows that 
a fetus is not going to be spontaneously (meaning “naturally”) or 
intentionally aborted. 
Theologian Louis Berkhof—a staunch proponent of Creation-
ism—sees a marked distinction in the Bible between the body, which 
is taken from earth, and the soul, which is given by God. Significantly, 
the creation story is the first example of this distinction. Genesis 2:7 
says that “God formed a man from the dust of the ground and breathed 
into his nostrils the breath of life.” Ecclesiastes 12:7 adds the com-
ment that “the dust returns to the ground it came from, and the spirit 
returns to God who gave it.” And Hebrews 12:9 makes the distinction 
between “human fathers” and the “Father of spirits,” concerning 
which the seventeeth-century Swiss Reformed clergyman Francis 
Turretin comments, “Why should God be called ‘the Father of spirits’ 
in contradistinction to ‘the fathers of the flesh’ unless the origin of 
each was different?”11 While these passages are not sufficient to bring 
us to a conclusion as to when the soul is introduced into the body, they 
do allow us to conclude that “body and soul are not only represented 
as different substances, but also as having different origins.”12 Physi-
cal substance comes from physical origins, and spiritual essence from 
a spiritual source. Berkhof maintains that Creationism is the most 
biblically-based view, claiming that “it is more consistent with the 
prevailing representations of Scripture than Traducianism.”13 
Berkhof is just one of the more recent representatives of a stream 
of thought that is rooted both in ancient Hebrew beliefs and in Aris-
totelian philosophy, a stream that is shared today by rabbinic Judaism 
and by much of Islam. Aristotle equated “life” and “soul,” but de-
scribed different kinds of the latter: vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, 
11 Francis Turretin, “Creationism or Traducianism: The Origin of the Soul,” quot-
ed by the website “On Doctrine”; http://www.ondoctrine.com/2tur0005.htm.
12 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publish-
ing Co., 1966), 199.
13 Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 199.
278 Anglican Theological Review
and intellectual. “In general,” Aristotle believed, “soul is imparted to 
the body in stages as each part is formed, and the specific soul is not 
actually present until the form is complete.”14 This “completion of 
form” takes place on the fortieth day after conception for males, and 
on the eightieth day for females. Augustine of Hippo (354–430) was a 
proponent of this view, and Thomas Aquinas (1205–1274) adopted 
Aristotle’s schema practically in its entirety. Aquinas held that
the body was formed gradually through the power transmitted by 
the male seed but the spiritual soul was directly created by God 
when the body was ready to receive it. Thus the embryo was be-
lieved to live at first the life of a plant, then the life of a simple  
animal, and only after all its organs, including the brain, had  
been formed, was it given, by the direct and creative act of God, 
an immortal spiritual soul.15
The Creationist views of Augustine and Aquinas were the norm 
in the Christian West from the early fifth century to the late nine-
teenth century. The Justinian Code of the sixth century excused from 
penalty abortions performed prior to forty days after conception. 
Pope Innocent III (c. 1216) and Pope Gregory IX (c. 1241) both af-
firmed the distinction between “vivified” fetuses (older than forty 
days) and those younger than so.16 Not until the Effraenatum of Pope 
Sixtus V in 1588 did the forty-day rule vanish and abortion was de-
clared illegal at any stage of fetal existence. But this ruling was re-
scinded by Sixtus’s successor Gregory XIV, and this repeal lasted until 
1869, when Pius IX reinstated the earlier decision. Even so, Pius’s 
decree did not become canon law until 1918—a mere ninety years 
ago.17
With respect to Protestantism, the writings of John Calvin and 
Martin Luther were interpreted by their immediate successors as 
supportive of the Traducianist position. Over time, however, many in 
the Calvinistic stream returned to the Creationist position, while 
14 Jones, “The Appeal to the Christian Tradition,” 274.
15 Jones, “The Appeal to the Christian Tradition,” 275. 
16 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Cath­
olic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 
88, 91, 232.
17 See David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law (New York: New York 
University Press, 1968), 268–269.
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Evangelical Protestants—derived mainly from Lutheran Pietism—
have remained nearly unanimous today in their advocacy of 
Traducianism.
Judaism
In Jewish law, a fetus becomes a full-fledged human being when 
the head emerges from the womb. Before that moment, the principle 
that applies is that of ubar yerekh imo: “the fetus is the thigh of its 
mother,” meaning that it may not be considered an independent en-
tity but is instead a “partial life.”18 This view is based on Exodus 21:22, 
which says that if a woman miscarries due to being struck by men 
fighting, and she herself is not seriously injured, the offender is to pay 
the husband of the woman a monetary fine for the loss. What is sig-
nificant here is that the Mosaic Law requires “life for life” (Exodus 
21:23). The above scenario, then, implies that the fetus is of worth 
(since payment is required for its destruction) but not of equal worth 
to, say, the life of the mother (or the punishment of the offender 
would have been death). The distinction is made here because the 
fetus is not considered to be nefesh adam (“a man”) but rather lav 
nefesh hu (“not a person”) until it is born.19
Philo (20 bce – 50 ce) was the first to address seriously the issue 
of ensoulment, using the scenario of Exodus 21:22 as his starting 
point. The Septuagint translation of the Tanakh had rendered the 
word ason in this passage as “form” rather than “harm,” thus changing 
the meaning from “if [there be] no harm [that is, death, to the mother], 
he shall be fined” to “if [there be] no form [yet, to the fetus], he shall 
be fined. . . . But if [there be] form, then shalt thou give life for life.”20 
Whereas the previous (and correct) translation would require only a 
fine for an abortion at any stage of a pregnancy, Philo makes a “before 
and after” distinction. He writes:
If one have a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike 
her a blow on her belly, and she miscarry; if the child which was 
conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall 
be punished by a fine, both for the assault which he committed 
and also because he has prevented nature—which was fashioning 
18 Babylonian Talmud, “Hulin,” 58a. Cited in Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish 
Law, 253.
19 Rashi, Yad Ramah. Cited in Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, 255.
20 Cited in Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, 257.
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and preparing that most excellent of all creatures, a human be-
ing—from bringing him into existence. But if the child which was 
conceived has assumed a distinct shape in all its parts, having re-
ceived all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall 
die; for such a creature as that is a man, whom he has slain while 
still in the workshop of nature, which had not thought it as yet a 
proper time to produce him to the light, but had kept him like a 
statue lying in a sculptor’s workshop, requiring nothing more than 
to be released and sent into the world.21
Philo held that the time of having assumed “a distinct shape in all its 
parts” was the fortieth day after conception, following the Aristotelian 
line of thinking.
Another context bearing upon this issue is that of the Sabbath 
laws, which contain no general permission for a violation in order to 
save a fetus. The wording of the Talmudic discussion of this issue sug-
gests two conclusions: “The fetus is not a person, not a man; but the 
fetus is indeed potential life and is to be treated as such.”22
One further illustration will serve to show just how complex this 
subject can actually become. There is within Judaism a factor known 
as “doubtful viability,” which holds that an embryo remains an embryo 
until thirty days after its birth, becoming only then a bar kayyama, a 
viable, living being.23 We find, then, in Judaism the same ambiguity 
regarding fetal life that we noted in Christianity. 
Islam
As the latest of the Abrahamic faith systems, Islam was able to 
build upon the thinking of its forbearers. The Aristotelian forty-day 
time period was incorporated into Islamic theology using the Qur’an’s 
Surah 23:12–14 as a starting point. This passage describes conception 
and fetal development in poetic form:
Then We placed [man] as (a drop of sperm) (nutfa) in a place of 
rest, firmly fixed; then We made the sperm into a clot (‘alaqa) of 
congealed blood; then of that clot We made a (foetus) lump 
(mudgha); then We made out of that lump bones and clothed the 
21 Philo, De Specialibus Legibus, II, 19.
22 Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, 264.
23 Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law, 253–254.
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bones with flesh; then We developed out of it another creature. So 
blessed be Allah, the Best to create!
Two hadiths (traditions) relate specifically to this passage. One 
states that “each of you is constituted in your mother’s womb for forty 
days as a nutfa, then it becomes an ‘alaqa for an equal period, then a 
mudgha for another equal period, then the angel is sent, and he 
breathes the soul into it.”24 The second states that “when forty-two 
nights have passed over the sperm drops, Allah sends an angel to it, 
who shapes it and makes its ears, eyes, skin, flesh and bones. Then 
he says, ‘O Lord! Is it male or female?’ And your Lord decides what he 
wishes and the angel records it.”25 Amplification of the latter hadith is 
found in Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s Musnad: “When Allah wants to complete 
its creation, He sends an angel. He tells the angel that which He com-
mands for it: for example, male or female, unhappy or joyful, short or 
tall, weak or strong, and he makes the person healthy or infirm.”26
Muslims who follow this line of reasoning believe that ensoul-
ment occurs on or immediately after the one hundred twentieth day 
of fetal life. At this point, the fetus is a fully constituted human being 
with specific rights. For instance, in circumstances similar to those 
found in Exodus 21:22 above, diya (“blood money”) is due to a couple 
who has lost their child, that child being considered a complete 
human being.
The Shi’ites have worked out an even more elaborate scheme of 
valuation, using a commentary on Surah 23 attributed to their first 
Imam, ‘Ali:
If the foetus is aborted prior to the coming of the spirit, then the 
blood money will be a hundred dinars divided into five parts as 
follows in accordance with the stages of the developing foetus as 
described by the verse: Fertilized ovum (nutfa): 20 dinars. Clot of 
blood (‘alaqa): 40 dinars. Lump of flesh (mudgha): 60 dinars. 
Bones (‘izam): 80 dinars. Flesh appearing on bones (lahm): 100 
dinars. After the coming of the spirit it will be the full blood 
money. Since it is a full human it will be a thousand dinars for a 
24 Sahih Muslim, Kitab ul­Qadr, cited in Muslim ibn al-Hajja al-Naysaburi, ed., 
Sahih Muslim, vol. 5 (Cairo: Dar al-Sha’b, n.d.), 496.
25 Sahih Muslim, 499–500.
26 Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad, vol. 1, 374–375.
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male and five hundred for a female in accordance with the 
gender.27
Similar to what we found in Judaism, however, “even within the 
first four months (i.e., 120 days), Islam regards life as sacrosanct.”28 
For instance, if a pregnant woman is found guilty of a capital crime, 
her execution is postponed until after her baby is born. Life is given 
by Allah, and all to whom Allah gives this gift—including embryos—
have the right to enjoy it.
Eastern­Reincarnationist Views
The Eastern view of life and death is much different from that of 
the West, mainly due to Eastern religions’ belief in reincarnation. These 
religions contain an interesting combination of Pre-existentianism 
and Traducianism. The Pre-existentianist component is seen in the fact 
that the atman (in Hinduism) or the skandhas (in Buddhism) are non-
material, eternally-existing entities that move from body to body within 
the illusion of maya. This belief does not, however, speak to the issue of 
when these entities become present within a fetus, and we find that the 
traditional Hindu/Buddhist teaching regarding the entry of the atman 
or skandhas is Traducianist in essence. This is indicated in Buddhism’s 
concept of the twelve-linked chain:
From the very earliest days, the theory of co-conditioned causal-
ity, or pratityasamutpada, the doctrine of the interrelatedness of 
all phenomena, was interpreted embryologically. In the form 
which came to be standard, dependent origination was expressed 
as a circle of twelve causal factors or links, which seem to operate 
simultaneously. As applied to the foetal development of an indi-
vidual, the first three links of the chain are ignorance, which gives 
rise to karma foundations, which in turn give rise to consciousness 
or vijnana.29
Vijnana, according to the fourth-century philosopher Vasu-
bandhu, is comprised of the five skandhas, which are present within 
27 Sayyid Hashim al-Bahrani, Al­Burhan fi tafsir al­Qur’an (Lebanon: al-Mu’assasat 
al-‘Alami li-al-Matbu’at, 1999), 335–336.
28 Anthony Kyriakides-Yeldham, “Islamic Medical Ethics and the Straight Path of 
God,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations (July 2005): 217.
29 R. E. Florida, “Buddhist Approaches to Abortion,” Asian Philosophy (March 
1991): 3.
 Conception and Ensoulment 283
the womb at the moment of conception and produce the reincarnated 
life.
What this boils down to is that Buddhists traditionally have under-
stood that the human being begins at the instant of conception 
when sperm, egg, and vijnana come together. As Taniguchi puts 
it, “there is no qualitative difference between an unborn foetus 
and a born individual.”30
In recent years there has been an influx of Eastern ideas into the 
Western world, and a “Westernized Eastern worldview” has devel-
oped. Gary Zukav, author of The Seat of the Soul, writes from such a 
position and his down-to-earth book is understandable to the masses. 
Zukav maintains that the body and soul are separate, with the soul 
being eternal. “A soul has no beginning and no end,” states Zukav, 
and, therefore, no one actually has the power to “kill” a fetus.31 
Generally, Western “New Agers” like Zukav adopt the doctrine of 
reincarnation from Eastern thinking but reject its Traducianist corol-
lary. Driven by the abortion controversy in the United States and Eu-
rope, Western advocates of Eastern philosophy have adopted the view 
that “life in this world begins when the spirit enters the child immedi-
ately after birth.”32 This process has been worked out in exacting 
detail:
A fetus still does not possess ki. This condition continues while the 
child passes through the birth canal, and the spirit-body (reitai) 
enters the child at the moment it comes in contact with the out-
side air (gaiki), and it experiences ki. . . . When the child comes in 
contact with the outside air, the spirit—which is made of ki—
enters the child at that moment and is able to see the karma of 
that child. This becomes that child’s karma for its entire life.33
In countries such as Japan where traditional Buddhism holds 
sway, the Traducianist view of ensoulment has led to a rapidly grow- 
ing phenomenon involving the practice of mizuko kuyō, a shrine-
ceremony that is believed to consign the departed souls of aborted 
30 Florida, “Buddhist Approaches to Abortion,” 3.
31 Gary Zukav, The Seat of the Soul (New York: Fireside, 1989), 185.
32 Komatsu Kayoko, “Mizuko Kuy and New Age Concepts of Reincarnation,” Jap­
anese Journal of Religious Studies 30, no. 3–4 (2003): 273.
33 Kayoko, “Reincarnation,” 273 n. 16.
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and miscarried fetuses into the care of the Bodhisattva Jizo Bosatsu. 
Mizuko (literally “water babies”) are believed to inhabit a limbo-like 
plane of existence that is neither heaven nor hell, but which at night is 
dark, cold, and inhabited by demonic spirits that frighten the tiny be-
ings. Jizo appears to comfort and protect those fetuses whose mothers 
have invoked his aid. This ceremony has become enormously popular 
since the early 1970s due to its alleged ability to assuage any guilt that 
may be felt from the act of abortion and to prevent any curses upon 
family members which might be forthcoming from the departed 
souls. Thus we have here an interesting syncretism employing a folk 
usage of religious psychology.34
The Influence of the Sociology of Religion on Theories of Ensoulment
One would be foolish to think that religious views—including 
views of ensoulment—are developed solely from scriptural (that is, 
revelational) sources. Human norms, expectations, and resolves about 
the existence of life are at least partially, and perhaps even chiefly, 
formed by the society in which people live. If that society has a high 
infant mortality rate, for instance, then individuals become hardened 
to the inevitability of death. On the other hand, if the society is char-
acterized by a low mortality rate, then they become sensitized to the 
cruelty of death. Compared to societies of the past, today’s Western 
world has fewer life-threatening concerns. As a result, intense emo-
tions are expended on what would earlier have been considered 
“lesser issues.” 
For example, an individual may today feel the same emotional 
intensity when deprived of television as a person living in the Middle 
Ages would have felt being deprived of food. The point is not that the 
modern person is shallow, but that human beings have a range of 
emotions to choose from, and the entirety of that range will be used 
in any given environment. People feel irritated when they do not re-
ceive what they desire to be part of their norm. Thus, a common irri-
tation for an American might be a day without television, while a com-
mon irritation in the Middle Ages would have been a day without 
dinner. The intensity of their feelings is the same. Feelings are either 
based upon or are in reaction to the absence of what someone consid-
ers to be his or her “normal” circumstances. Thus, an individual’s or a 
34 For an excellent study of this phenomenon, see Kayoko, “Reincarnation.”
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society’s convictions and feelings about matters of conception, ensoul-
ment, contraception, abortion, childbirth, and the like are based on 
the normative expectations regarding “life” and “death.”
Another sociological influence that molds one’s view of “life” is 
the family unit. The most important function of the family in the past 
was survival. Today the chief function is generally seen to be 
“comfort”—a notion that is in essence a “feeling.” Sociologist James 
Davison Hunter explains, “Feelings [today] play a prominent role at 
all points of the family life cycle: in uniting couples, in rearing chil-
dren, in binding families together. Yet the emotional factor has not 
always figured so prominently. It was nearly foreign to family dynam-
ics in centuries past.”35 What is significant about this distinction in 
regard to our topic is the attitude toward birth and children that each 
family type produces. In the past, if a wife was pregnant her concerns 
were “Will I survive this pregnancy?” or “Will there be enough food 
and clothing during the time I’m unable to work?” There was no need 
for the couple to bond over the upcoming (potential) baby because 
they had other means of bonding, through working together to sur-
vive and provide for their family. Now, couples have little to bond over 
after the initial feelings of “being in love” disappear. In a society of 
equal rights, governmental assistance, and wealth, both the husband 
and the wife are able to survive independently of one another. Other 
means of bonding emotionally had to evolve to protect the marriage 
relationship. One of these means was through the wife’s pregnancy. 
Today, the wife’s as well as the husband’s concerns are “How do we 
feel about the pregnancy?” or “How should we prepare for the baby?” 
If the family unit is anticipating and relying on a new baby’s arrival to 
solidify the family unit, then that baby is worth more emotionally to-
day than it would have been in the past.
The evolution of the family unit’s function, and thus the family 
members’ worldviews, is also marked by a change in how infants and 
children are treated. In the past, children were given little serious rec-
ognition. Indeed, “childhood was not considered a distinct and sepa-
rate period of life. No distinction was made between the young and old 
in work or in play, aptly symbolized by the fact that children and adults 
wore similar dress. Infants were distinct from adults, of course, yet 
35 James Davison Hunter, Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation (Chicago, Ill.: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 83.
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they were typically regarded with a measure of indifference.”36 Hunter 
explains why infants were often virtually ignored. First, there was little 
time for recreation or “bonding time.” Second, there was a high rate of 
infant mortality. Whether rich or poor, one in three babies died within 
the first three years of life. One in two never reached adulthood. The 
obvious reaction, then, was that “it was simply too much to expect par-
ents to allow maternal and paternal affections to grow and to invest 
energy in the child’s future given the likelihood that the child would 
not live to see that future.” Consequently, “infants, for all practical 
purposes, did not really warrant human status.”37 
It should be obvious why such sociological factors contributed in 
large part to a Creationist view of ensoulment rather than a Traduci-
anist view. The high mortality rate of earlier centuries caused mothers 
and fathers to become accustomed to babies dying near birth or 
shortly thereafter, and Creationism’s tenets—that God would not in-
troduce a soul into an infant he knew would never have a chance to 
live—would be of enormous comfort. 
Mortality rates also correlate with whether a society is agricul-
tural or industrial. Agricultural communities become accustomed to 
death as a normal part of a rural lifestyle. Farm animals die, animals 
are killed on a regular basis for food, and population control of strays 
and pets is necessary for people to have enough to eat. If the society 
in which one lives involves the necessary killing of other life forms, 
then human beings become familiar with and understanding of the 
necessity of death. Since in earlier centuries even human infants were 
unlikely to reach adulthood, people did not consider life “sacred” un-
til a much later age. This is difficult for a modern person to under-
stand, but “in many societies practicing infanticide, infants were not 
deemed to be fully human until they underwent a rite of initiation 
that took place from a few days to several years after birth, and there-
fore killing before such initiation was socially acceptable. The pur-
poses of infanticide were various: child spacing or fertility control in 
the absence of effective contraception; elimination of illegitimate, de-
formed, orphaned, or twin children; or sex preferences.”38 Feelings 
36 Hunter, Evangelicalism, 84.
37 Hunter, Evangelicalism, 84.
38 Michael S. Teitelbaum, “Population,” in Britannica Online Encyclopedia (Sep-
tember 2007); http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-60664. 
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about when life begins, then, are often significantly influenced by a 
specific environment and its view of death. 
Further, since life in general was not a given, there was no room 
for either human or animal life to be prized. Today’s pet cemeteries 
would be laughable to previous generations. But during the Middle 
Ages, says Hunter, “it was not uncommon for children who died in 
infancy to be buried in the garden or next to the house in the same 
way that people of later centuries buried domestic dogs or cats.”39 
As nations became less agriculturally based and more industrial-
ized, their exposure to and acceptance of death decreased proportion-
ally. As a result, the attitude toward fetuses, infants, and children began 
to change. Child psychology first emerged during the late eighteenth 
century, when “maternal indifference gave way to affection and senti-
mentality.” Significantly, “accompanying the sentimentalization of 
childhood and adolescence was the view that children were not just 
‘charming toys’ but ‘fragile creatures of God who needed to be both 
safeguarded and reformed.’”40 Since many in modern nations do not 
encounter death, not even on a small scale, life itself has become 
sacralized in a way that previous generations would have found 
irrational. And because life has been imbued with such sacrality, Tra-
ducianism—which sacralizes human life from the very point of con-
ception—is a much more fitting position for modern industrialized 
societies.
Implications
Our discussion of ensoulment has clear implications for many of 
the leading issues with which our contemporary societies are dealing, 
including abortion, contraception, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell 
research. It can be readily understood how significant one’s view re-
garding ensoulment is for these phenomena. Simply put, if one is a 
Traducianist, completely convinced that an embryo is a fully-ensouled 
human being from the first seconds of its existence, then the destruc-
tion of unused fertilized eggs, the harvesting of stem cells from fetal 
tissue, forms of contraception that are essentially abortifacients, and 
all elective abortions performed at any stage of the gestation period 
would be considered the termination of human life. If, however, one 
39 Hunter, Evangelicalism, 84.
40 Hunter, Evangelicalism, 85.
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is a convinced Creationist, holding that ensoulment does not occur 
until—at the earliest—the fortieth day after conception, and possibly 
not until as long as thirty days after birth itself, then one’s convictions 
concerning the abovementioned procedures may be vastly different 
from those of the Traducianist. Let us examine the implications of 
these views more closely.
Traducianism
Almost without exception, Traducianists are pro-life in orienta-
tion. Given their presuppositions, it is completely logical for them to 
be utterly convinced that “abortion is nothing less than murder, the 
taking of innocent human life.”41 Even in the absence of incontrovert-
ible revelational or scientific proof for their position, they are con-
vinced that to err at their end of the pro-life/pro-choice spectrum 
shows greater moral integrity than advocating a position at the oppo-
site end. Few—if any—Traducianists harbor any doubts whatsoever 
regarding the rightness—or righteousness—of their position. The 
same cannot be said for proponents of the other views.
There are, nevertheless, several problematic aspects of the Tra-
ducianist view. For one thing, in their attempts to gain the support of 
a majority of Westerners, pro-life advocates must often present their 
case in a skewed fashion. This is so because “lacking a secular ratio-
nale, pro-life forces nevertheless try to marshal apparently secular 
support for the fetal right to life. One stratagem is to generate moral 
concern for early stages of human life by playing on their later stages. 
. . . Abortion opponents never carry posters depicting newly conceived 
embryos, which when magnified look more like buckyballs than 
people.”42
Additionally, Traducianists must often go to extremes to prove 
that abortion causes mental harm (in the form of guilt, trauma, or 
the like) as well as physical harm (in the form of sterility and other gy-
necological difficulties). Given that in most cases “the research that 
specifically aims to causally link mental health problems and abortion 
has been conducted by those opposed to abortion,”43 the published 
41 Waltke, “Reflections,” 3.
42 Thomas W. Clark, “Faith in Hiding: Are There Secular Grounds for Banning 
Abortion?” in The Humanist (July-August 2007): 27–31.
43 Warren Throckmorton, “Abortion and Mental Health,” The Washington Times 
(January 21, 2006): A13.
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studies, especially in nonscientific journals and magazines, are often 
unreliable. For instance, a study conducted in New Zealand and pub-
lished in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry found that 
those who had an abortion prior to age twenty-one were more likely to 
have a mental disorder from ages twenty-one to twenty-five than those 
of the same age who did not become pregnant or who did become 
pregnant but did not abort. However, this study has been dismissed by 
the American Psychological Association as inconclusive because it was 
not well designed enough to determine whether abortion itself con-
tributes to an increased risk of mental illness. According to Nancy 
Russo, Professor of Psychology and Women’s Studies at Arizona State 
University, “for U.S. women, pre-existing mental health problems, re-
lationship quality, and whether the pregnancy was wanted or unwanted 
are key factors determining post-abortion mental distress, not the 
abortion itself.” Dr. Russo also believes that “telling women an abor-
tion is wrong may create guilt and shame in some, but those feelings 
are rooted in social disapproval and not abortion per se.”44 
The general assumption that exists within the Christian commu-
nity—that those who have undergone abortions incur higher rates of 
psychological distress—is not borne out by objective research. Ac-
cording to the APA’s briefing paper on abortion, “Well-designed stud-
ies of psychological responses following abortion have consistently 
shown that risk of psychological harm is low. Some women experience 
psychological dysfunction following abortion, but post-abortion  rates 
of distress and dysfunction are lower than pre-abortion rates.”45 Based 
on these studies, it would be possible to argue that refusing to allow 
the termination of an unwanted pregnancy could conceivably add 
more to the sum total of pain and distress in the modern world than 
an abortion would yield. One is left with the excruciatingly difficult 
choice between the permanent destruction of an unborn fetus—the 
status of which is ambiguous—or permanent damage to the psyche 
and life circumstances of an already-living person.
Also problematic is the fact that Traducianists are often far from 
consistent in their position regarding pre-birth embryology. If the 
pro-life advocate’s purpose is to save lives by saving embryos, why are 
44 Throckmorton, “Abortion and Mental Health,” A13.
45 David M. Fergusson, L. John Horwood, and Elizabeth Ridder, “Abortion in 
Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health,” Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry 47, no. 1 (January 2006): 20.
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fertility clinics, which house frozen embryos that are discarded when 
no longer needed, not targeted as frequently and to the same extent 
as abortion clinics? One seldom picks up a newspaper and reads about 
pro-life advocates picketing fertility clinics. As Irving Weissman points 
out, “Most people who object to destroying human embryos for re-
search don’t protest [in vitro fertilization] itself, which routinely 
produces embryos that end up being destroyed.”46 On the contrary, 
these institutions are often praised by the religiously devout, who see 
them as “a blessing from God so that couples can become parents.” If 
pro-life advocates truly believed embryos were human beings, they 
should also require that all embryos created by in vitro fertilization be 
implanted and brought to term. They should be advocating the en-
forcement of fetal health and the outlawing of certain forms of contra-
ception. Do such inconsistencies mean that pro-life advocates do not 
actually believe an embryo is a person? No, but they appear to indi-
cate that many Traducianists choose the implications that are the most 
“trendy,” or have quite simply not considered that their views have 
implications for other areas besides abortion.
Stem cell research and in vitro fertilization opponents, along with 
anti-abortion activists, all have the same intense emotions that fuel 
their rhetoric. But they fail to note that the illogic of many of their 
actions damages their credibility, often irrevocably. They seem also to 
be unaware or uncaring of the fact that there are equally intense emo-
tions that are driving those who have an opposing view. To a man or 
woman caring for an invalid spouse or child, or to a couple desperate 
for a child of their own, there is an inescapable poignancy to questions 
such as Weissman’s: “Does the fate of an embryo matter as much as 
the health of a living person?”47
Finally, there is an interesting theological problem that arises 
for those holding the Traducianist position. According to New York 
Times writer Gina Kolata, 31 percent of women experience a known 
miscarriage,48 and even this figure is considered by many to be on 
the low side: “The true rate of early pregnancy loss is close to 50% 
because of the high number of chemical pregnancies that are not 
46 Jon Cohen, “Stem Cell Pioneers,” Smithsonian (December 2005): 82.
47 Cohen, “Stem Cell Pioneers,” 80.
48 Gina Kolata, “Study Finds 31% Rate of Miscarriage,” New York Times (July 27, 
1988): 15.
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recognized in the 2–4 weeks after conception.”49 This statistic be-
comes extremely problematic if all of those miscarriages are deemed 
actual human beings. First, it seems clear that the human body does 
regularly abort fetuses spontaneously. Why would God have designed 
female physiology in such a way that for every life that is produced, 
another is destroyed?
Next, consider that the cumulative population of the earth 
throughout history is estimated to be approximately 60 billion per-
sons.50 If that number represents the 50 percent that survived preg-
nancy, then there are at least 60 billion souls that did not survive and 
who have never lived a day on earth. If those souls are innately evil, as 
Christianity teaches on the basis of such passages as Psalm 58:3 (“The 
wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they 
are born, speaking lies,” ASV), then more than 60 billion human be-
ings were essentially born into hell. How disturbing to think of souls 
being eternally tormented without ever having the chance of living an 
earthly life. Some, of course, would argue that infants are innocent, 
and therefore those 60 billion souls are all in “heaven.” But even this 
claim is theologically problematic, for would it not imply that “heaven” 
is overwhelmingly populated by fetuses that were spontaneously or 
intentionally aborted? Is this a heaven that Jews, Christians, or Mus-
lims would be satisfied to be a part of?
Creationism
If the tenets of Creationism are true and the fetus does not have 
a soul until it is given one by God at a time determined by his sover-
eign will, then the social issues we have discussed above do not neces-
sarily involve the termination of a human life. The issue may be stated 
thusly: “The debate about the rights of the embryo is often framed as 
the question of whether or not it’s a person. . . . The substantive issue 
about personhood is whether the zygote and later stages of the em-
bryo and fetus have the same rights as uncontroversial existing per-
sons. . . . The current secular consensus, however, is that all stages of 
human life do not merit equal protection.”51 With this statement, 
Creationists could generally agree.
49 John C. Petrozza, “Early Pregnancy Loss,” eMedicine website (November 15, 
2007): http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic3241.htm. 
50 Martin Rees, Our Final Hour (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 136.
51 Clark, “Faith in Hiding,” 28.
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In addition to the religious and theological considerations dis-
cussed above, the implications of this doctrine are most harmoni- 
ous with statistics, reason, and psychologists’ findings. The problems 
encountered with Traducianism disappear almost entirely. Propo- 
nents of Creationism are able to say in good conscience that “God 
does not create a soul for a fetus that he knows is going to be a sponta-
neous or induced abortion, or for a fertilized ovum he knows will be 
discarded.” 
Creationism, then, appears to be much more amenable to statis-
tics concerning the body’s natural disposal of early life forms. The 
Creationist view is also most in line with what is, to many, psychologi-
cally obvious: “We intuitively understand this [that embryos do not 
have souls] when we judge, uncontroversially, that it is not a human 
tragedy that a high percentage of fertilized eggs never achieve im-
plantation but are expelled naturally during menstruation.” It is gen-
erally observed that people naturally feel more concern for later 
stages of human life because “ordinary human psychology generates 
different levels of concern for different stages. We are generally more 
protective and concerned about an entity that clearly has sentience 
and self-pertaining interests than something that clearly has neither.” 
After all, “unless ideology intrudes, we naturally feel more concern 
for a person with fully developed capacities and a network of estab-
lished relationships than we do for an entity possessing neither.”52 
Therefore, “as societies secularize, it becomes increasingly difficult 
for religious ideologies to suppress [what is] psychological reality.”53 
Does all of the above imply that since a fetus in the earliest stages 
of the gestation period may be without a soul, termination of a preg-
nancy or the destruction of fertilized ova are inconsequential acts? 
Not at all. In actuality, Creationists may well be just as opposed to 
abortion, stem cell research, and certain forms of contraception as 
Traducianists. But their objections will be of a different nature. 
Conclusions: How Shall We Then Live?
In the end we find that we are faced with a division of duties and 
responsibilities. Science is able to tell us about “life,” using its own 
quantifiable criteria. If an object is growing, with cells dividing and 
52 Clark, “Faith in Hiding,” 28.
53 Clark, “Faith in Hiding,” 29.
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metabolic processes occurring, if it moves and if it reproduces, it is 
“alive.” And while “life” is, of course, significant in and of itself, the 
above characteristics are just as true of animals as of human beings.
Therefore to scholars of religion there falls a much more intimi-
dating task. We are called to speak of that which science—with all of 
its remarkable and subtle instruments—can say nothing about. Seek-
ing to remain neutral concerning this issue or ignoring it completely 
is unacceptable and amounts to an inexcusable neglect of our calling 
in life. It is our lot to speak of “the soul,” of how its presence within a 
collection of living tissues distinguishes mere “biological life” from 
truly “human life.” We believe that inherent in this task are at least 
three objectives to which we should give our full attention and which 
we should make every effort to fulfill.
First, we must teach in our classrooms and in other venues in 
such a way that the general public learns that the matter of ensoul-
ment is an enormously complex issue. We must show by example that 
the implications of such an issue should not be undermined by denial 
or neutrality, but should be approached in a loving, fair, and nonjudg-
mental fashion. We must explain that religious beliefs regarding this 
subject—even within a single religion such as Christianity—span a 
very wide spectrum, and all attempts to simplify these matters in an 
unrealistic manner will doom us to continued misunderstanding and 
acrimony. Neither natural science nor revelation—natural or spe-
cial—has produced sufficient data for surety regarding these issues. 
Consequently, discussion and debate regarding contraception, abor-
tion, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research must be brought to a 
higher level of sophistication than is currently extant.
Second, in the course of our discussions we should adopt a 
vocabulary that avoids hyperbole and unwarranted assumptions. Ter-
minology that is brutal and accusatory, such as “murderers” and 
“baby-killers,” should be eliminated. After all, can we know with ab-
solute certainty that the abovementioned activities do indeed involve 
“murder”? If there is no incontrovertible revelational teaching regard-
ing this issue, might one not essentially be violating a moral require-
ment that is incontrovertible (for example, “Thou shalt not bear false 
witness”) by misinforming the public concerning “what God has said” 
regarding these subjects? Why not focus our attention and resources 
on larger issues, such as the spiritual, sociological, psychological, and 
physiological tragedies that give rise to the very ethical issues we are 
discussing? 
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After all, there are many other reasons for objecting to elective 
abortions. One may argue, for instance, that contemporary pro-choice 
attitudes toward abortion rights ultimately represent the following:
A. Disrespect for God’s creative purposes and for human exis­
tence in general. Being nonchalant about abortion expresses 
disregard for God’s ordered plan for humanity. The Creator 
designed a natural way of reproducing life and abortion is 
a rejection of that design. Becoming pregnant involves 
the creation of a potentially eternal being, and to adopt an 
attitude of just “getting rid of” such a being devalues and 
degrades the entire concept of human existence. 
B. A cavalier and rebellious attitude toward human sexuality. 
God made men and women physiologically different so that 
they would be able to “fill the earth” with progeny (Genesis 
1:27–28) and to enjoy physical intimacy within the protec-
tive confines of a marriage covenant (Hebrews 13:4). There 
is nothing about abortion that is either pro-creation or pro-
intimacy. A non-committal, non-intimate approach to sexual 
intercourse is in violation of God’s revealed plan for human-
kind (1 Corinthians 6:15–20).
C. A “cover­up for evil” (1 Peter 2:16). In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, a woman who elects to terminate her preg-
nancy is seeking to avoid or reject the consequence of her 
sexual sin. She is availing herself of what essentially becomes 
a last-ditch method of birth control. But procuring an abor-
tion in order to nullify the consequences of sexual sin is ulti-
mately unsuccessful; instead, it brings other evil conse-
quences. For example, since China has enforced population 
control laws and legalized late-term abortions, pregnancy 
termination has now become a means of sex selection, re-
sulting in discrimination against females and contributing to 
a gender imbalance in the population. 
D. Economic irresponsibility. Seen from a financial perspec-
tive, abortion is an enormously wasteful medical procedure. 
As crass as it may sound, a condom costs fifty cents while an 
abortion costs hundreds of dollars. It is irresponsible and 
selfish for persons who lack the discipline to use a proper 
means of birth control to then place the burden of payment 
upon taxpayers, who indirectly support abortions through 
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government subsidies of organizations such as Planned 
Parenthood.
Lastly, we should do all in our power to provide a “middle way” 
between the extremists that inhabit both ends of the pro-life/
pro-choice spectrum. It is a tragedy that the church is often the last 
place a woman who has had an abortion will go. A simplistic judgmen-
talism will succeed only in polarizing individuals and groups. Anony-
mous letters such as one received by Dr. George Woodward that 
threatened, “If you continue I will hunt you down like any other wild 
beast and kill you,”54 are all too often highlighted by the media and do 
nothing to resolve the situation. 
We believe that a majority of Christians do not condone such 
behavior. They are instead embarrassed by and apologetic concerning 
such fanatical attitudes. But separating themselves from extremists in 
the eyes of a watching world will require more from spiritually-
minded persons than pink-cheeked apologies. Such separation will 
require patient listening, careful and thoughtful discussion, and self-
sacrificing compassion. It will require a frank willingness to acknowl-
edge a multitude of possible truths, and, therefore, a necessary change 
in the overall approach of opponents to abortion to these issues.
These are truly awesome responsibilities. As ambassadors of the 
kingdom of heaven, our words and our actions concerning these is-
sues can have profound implications for social structures, for moral 
and ethical considerations, and for the psyches of both women and 
men. Let us therefore be “shrewd as snakes and as innocent as doves” 
(Matthew 10:16) in our stewardship of the concept of “ensoulment” 
and of its implications for humanity.
54 Melinda Liu, “Inside the Anti-Abortion Underground,” Newsweek 29 (August 
1994): 28.

